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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CRISIS OR 
PATIENT COMPENSATION CRISIS? 
Kathryn Zeiler· 
INTRODucnON 
Tort reform has been a hot topic among those interested in assess-
ing whether and how well the tort system aids injured plaintiffs' ability 
to achieve civil justice. The debate has been especially heated when it 
comes to medical malpractice liability. Proponents of malpractice lia-
bility reforms-reforms such as damages caps and shifts from joint 
and several liability to proportionate liability-argue that the broken 
and out-of-control liability system is error-prone and produces too 
many jumbo verdicts.! According to this argument, the huge and 
highly variable awards cause medical malpractice insurers to increase 
premiums, which leads to an increase in the cost of healthcare, an in -
crease in the number of uninsured, and a decrease in the number of 
physicians who are willing to practice in jurisdictions that are some-
times labeled as "judicial hellholes."2 
Tort reform opponents, on the other hand, tend to argue that limita-
tions on recovery or access to the tort system violate constitutional 
rights and that some reforms do more harm than good. For example, 
they claim that damages caps make it difficult for a subset of negli-
gently injured plaintiffs to find a lawyer who is willing to pursue a 
legal claim on a contingency fee basis. Opponents also argue that the 
liability system is not the cause of insurance premium spikes;3 thus, 
reforms should not be expected to stabilize premiums, at least in the 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; zei ler@law.georgetown.edu: 
www.georgetown.edulfacultyfkmz3l. Special thanks to Leslie Street, Georgetown University 
Law Center Reference Librarian and resear,h wmpanion: Juliette Forstenzer. LLM 2009, Ge· 
orgetown University Law Center: Kristen Gorzclany, J.D. Candidate 2012, Georgetown Univer· 
sity Law Center; and David Thornton, J.D. Candidate 2011 , Georgetown University Law Cenler. 
I. See discussion infra Pari II . 
2. See infra nOles 21 - 27, 45, 72-73, 82 and accompanying text; William Lamb. Pro· Lawsuit 
Crol'p Wan lS President's Ear. ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2005 (,hara'ierizing Madison 
and 51. Clair cOl.lnlies, in lllinnis, as Uj l.ldkial hellholes"). 
3. See discussion infra Part II . 
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long run.4 Some opponents further argue that the unreformed tort 
system does not do enough to compe nsate negligently injured 
patients.!i 
Until recently, rhetoric about the liability system and its relation-
ship to both insurance markets and provider supply dominated tort 
reform debates. While claims made by both proponents and oppo-
nents may seem intuitive, they are often unsubstantiated. ID recent 
years, however, academics and others have acquired or created 
datasets to perform analyses with the purpose of enhancing our un-
derstanding of the relationship between the tort system and medical 
malpractice insurance markets. These studies have helped to shift tort 
reform debates away from rhetoric and toward inferences drawn from 
facts that are reported in empirical studies. 
While empirical research has been useful in shifting po licy debates 
from rhetoric to reality, not all aspects of the tort reform debate have 
been empirically addressable. Most notably, although the vast major-
ity of medical malpractice cases are resolved through private senle-
ments between medical malpractice insurers, providers, and patients, 
resea rchers have been historically unable to observe settlement out-
comes.6 This limitation has, in turn, limited our ability to observe 
both the impact of the liability stystem on important outcomes and the 
impact on the liability system of changes to the legal rules. Recently 
discovered datasets collected by state insurance departments, how-
ever, have provided a window into settlement outcomes, allowing us 
to examine important connections between liability systems and insur-
ance markets.1 . Using these datasets we have been able to track, for 
the first time in some cases, comprehensive trends in the numbe r of 
claims and the size of payouts over time; potential impacts of tort re-
4. We might expect short·term decreases in premiums if insurers expect reduced losses. If 
refonns do not in fact reduce losses, however, insurers are forced to increase prices to compen· 
sate for short-tenn underpricing. 
5. See David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpracrice, 350 
NEW ENG. J. MEO. 283, 285 (2004) ("Only 2 percent of negligent injuries resulted in claims 
. ... "); accord Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, The ejfects of TOrI Reform 011 
Medical Malpractice l!lSurers' Ultimate LosSl!s, 16 J. RISK & INS. 191, 198 (2009). 
6. See VASANl'HAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAl... MAI...PRACTICE 32 (2OCH); Patricia Munch 
Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Sell/emen' oul of Coun: The Disposilion of Medical Malprac/ice 
Claims, 12 J. LEGAl... STlJo. 345, 341 (1983); S tephen 1. Spurr & Walter O. Simmons, Medical 
Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J . H EA I...TtI POI.- POI...'y & LAW 315, 323 n.16 
(1996). 
1. See, e.g., Bernard Black et aI., Stability, NOI Crisis: Medical Malpraclice Claim Oil/comes in 
Texas, 1988-2()()2,2 J. EMPIR ICAL LEGAl... Sruo. Z01, 209 (2005) (describing Texas's closed claims 
medical malpractice dataset); Neil Vidmar et a I. , Unrovering Ihe "Invisible '· Profile of Medical 
Malpractice tili8ation: i!lSi8hlS from Florida. 54 DEPAU l... L. REV. 315, 318 (ZOOS) (describing 
Florida's d osed medical malpractice dataset). 
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form on recoveries; connections between policy limits and payouts; 
trends in purchases of coverage over time; and trends in defense 
costS.8 
The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) was one of the first slate 
insurance departments to collect and make publicly available c1aims-
level data on closed medical malpractice c1aims.9 TDl began collect-
ing and reporting data on closed claims in the late 1980s, following a 
sharp rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums.1o When a 
Texas insurer closes a medical malpractice claim, it is required to re-
port certain information about payments, patient characteristics, liti-
gation outcomes, timing of litigation procedures and outcomes, 
location where the injury occurred, jurisdiction of the lawsuit , and 
characteristics of other defendants and payments made by each.tt 
During the pe riod from 1988 to 2005, Texas insurers filed roughly 
16,000 reports related to closed medical malpractice c1aimsP 
8. See Black et aI., supra note 7; David A. Hyman et al ., Do Defendanls Pay Whal Juries 
Award? Posl-Verdicl Haireuls in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003,4 J. EMPIKICAL 
LECAL STUD. 3,5 (2007) [hereinafler Hyman et aI. , Defendcwts Payl ; David A. Hyman CI aI., 
£Srimming the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpraclice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J . 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 355, 355 (2009) (he re inafter Hyman et a I. , Evidence from Texas]; Kathryn 
Zeiler et al., Physicians' illsurance Limits and Ma lpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas 
Closed Claims, 199fJ-2(}()3, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 59 (2007). 
9. See TEX. DEP'Y OF INS .. 1997 TEXAS LIAOILITY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM ANNUAL RE. 
PORT (1997), available UI http://www.tdi.state.tx.uslreportslreport4.html (last visi ted July 13, 
2(09). 
10. See Black et al .. supra note 7, at 208, 215 (describing the da ta co llected by the Texas 
Department of Insurance (TOI ». The description of the data in the text is auributed to Black et 
al. unless otherwise indica ted. A "claim" in this context is a request by an insured provider for 
indemnification for an incurred or expected loss from an insured peril . See TEX. DEPT OF INS., 
TEXAS CLOSED CLAIM REPORTING GUIDE (2004) [hereinafter REPORTING GUIDE] (on fi le with 
au thor). Claims filed by the insured are not always accompanied by the fi ling of a lawsuit . A 
claim is considered closed when the insurer has made all indemnity and expense payments on 
Ihe claim. See id. TOI has audi ted the data for completeness and accuracy (but for only some 
variables) since 1990. Black el al. exclude 1988-1989 when reporting number of claims due 10 
potential incompleteness. See Black et aI. , supra nOle 7, a t 215. 
11. See REPORTING GUtDE, supra note 10. TDI does some work to audit reports. See Black 
et al. , supra nOle 7, at 215. 
12. Set! Hyman et aI. , EvidenCt! from Texas, supra note 8, a t 364. The data TDI collects vary 
according to the size of the total known payment to the claimant by all defendants. For claims 
with payments less than $24,999. insurers are not required to repor t the cause of the injury; 
therefore, separal ing medical malpraclice claims from othe r types of clairru; is impossible. For 
this reason, most results are produced using only "large" claims-those with total payments of at 
least $25,000. In addition, TDI does not adjust the reporting threshold from year 10 year. There-
fore, the number of claims reported as large claims will increase over time due in part to inna-
tion. To control for this, we exclude claims with payouts measured in 1988 dollars tha t fa ll 
between S25,OOO (nominal ) and 525,000 (1988 dollars). For example, we excluded all claims 
closed in 1989 with payouts between $25,000 and $26,205 (buying power of $25,000 in 1988 
dollars). 
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Datasets like the one TDI generates and distributes allow us to bet-
ter assess the liability system's ability to deliver just outcomes. They 
also allow us to verify or challenge claims made by proponents and 
opponents of tort reform, assess the impacts of tort reform on impor-
tant outcomes, and better understand the relationship between the lia-
bility system and insurance markets. Instead of supporting claims 
made by those who blame medical malpractice liability system crises 
for rising insurance premiums, results using closed claims data, when 
taken as a whole, suggest that we might instead be facing a patient 
compensation crisis. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part II summarizes the com-
mon rhetoric in tort reform debates that places the blame for rising 
premiums on the liability system and touts tort reform as the cure-all 
for ailing insurance markets.13 It then summarizes empirical results, 
produced using Texas closed claims data and other data, which suggest 
not only that Texas tort reform advocates wrongly placed blame on 
the liability system, but also that noneconomic damages caps passed in 
2003 have caused more harm than good. 14 Part III describes results 
that suggest that the widely used tactic of pointing to jumbo jury ver-
dicts to justify tort reform is misguided. IS While verdicts and payouts 
are positively correlated, patients and their lawyers, on average, re-
cover only fifty-six cents of each dollar awarded. 16 In addition, the 
larger the verdict, the lower the fraction paid.17 While judicial over-
sight and damages caps explain about a third of the difference be-
tween verdicts and payouts, the largest chunk of the difference is 
explained by the fact that patients rarely recover more than the pro-
vider's insurance policy limits. This finding is cause for concern, espe-
cially given the fact that coverage purchased by Texas physicians is 
lower than conventional wisdom would predict and is continually on 
the decline. 18 The data paint a picture not of a liability system in cri-
sis, but of a patient compensation crisis, one that might severely limit 
the ability of the liability system to deliver civil justice to negligently 
injured patients. 
13. See infra nOles 19--44 and accompanying le~l. 
14. See infra nOles 46-71 and accompanying le~l. 
15. See infra nOles 72-127 and accompanying lexl. 
16. See Hyman el ai. , Defendants Pay , supra nOle 8, 01 4. 
17. Id. 
18. See discussion infra Pari 1I1.C. 
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n. THE TORT REFORM DEBATE 
In 1999, Texas medical malpractice insurers started to sharply in~ 
crease insurance premiums. 19 Some insurers continued to increase 
rates through 2003.20 Proponents of tort reform argued that an out-
of-control liability system was causing the sudden and sharp premium 
increase.21 Specifically, they maintained that medical malpractice in-
surers had no choice but to increase premiums both because the num-
ber of claims and the size of payments were on the rise, and because 
juries were increasingly handing down outrageously large damages 
awards.22 They also claimed that the broken liability system regularly 
and handsomely rewarded sympathetic plaintiffs who brought frivo-
lous claims.23 
In 2003, the Texas legislature passed a tort reform package that in-
cluded caps on noneconomic damages in an effort to address the per-
ceived insurance and tort system crisis.24 During the run-up to 
passage, supporters claimed that "[c]apping noneconomic damages at 
reasonable limits would encourage insurers to do business in Texas by 
ensuring that they would not incur massive losses because of large 
damage awards."2s Some went further to claim that public resources 
were at stake: Texas Senator Robert Deuell argued during floor de-
bate that " (w]hen noneconomic damages are excessive, it 's really not 
the defendant ... that pays. It's the other people who pay into the 
insurance plans. "16 Deuell went on to assert that taxpayers ultimately 
pay for excessive awardsP 
19. Su Black et aI., supra nOle 7. at 224 fig.L 
20. Id. 
21. Eric Torbenson & Jason Roberson, TOfl Reform: Is This Change Healfhy? DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, June 17, 2007, at lA, 14A; Texans for Lawsuit Reform, Texas Urgently Needs 
Tort Reform to Avert Furthe r Damage to Healthcare System, http://www.lonreform.com/nodel 
173 (last visited July 13, 2009). 
22. Su Torbcnson & Roberson, supra note 21, at 14A. 
23. See Texans for Lawsuit Reform, supra note 21; Mike Thomas, Op-Ed .. Medical Malprac· 
lice Needs an Overhaul, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 6, 2009, at BI. 
24. HOUSE RESEARCH ORO., Focus REPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS PII.OPOSED 
FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT, H.R. No. 78·10, at 33. (2003), available at http://www.capito l.state. tx.usl 
focuslamend78.pdf. 10 addition to caps on noneconomic damages, the ton reform package in· 
eluded other provisions meant to reduce expected liability such as modifications to joint and 
several liability rules and the possibility of periodic payments. See Ronen Avraham, Dalabase of 
Slate La ... TorI Reforms (DSTLR, 2nd) 116--18 (Nw. Uoiv. Sch. of Law, Law & Ecoo. Research 
Paper No. ()6-{)8, 2(06), available at hup:lfssm.comlabsuact=902711. 
25. HOUSE RESEAII.CH 011.0. , Focus REPOII.T OF CONSTlTl.ITIONAL AMENDMENTS PII.OPOSED 
FOR SEPT. 2003 BALLOT, H.R. No. 78·10, at 33 (2003), available at hUp:llwww.capitol.slate.lx.usl 
focuslamcod78.pdf. 
26. 'd. 
27. Black et al., supra note 7, at Dl fig.4. 
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Whjle rhetoric often takes center stage in tort reform debates, re-
cent compilation and dissemination of comprehensive datasets on 
closed medical malpractice insurance claims has allowed us to observe 
actual trends in medical malpractice litigation and to get a better han-
dle on the relationship between the liability system and insurance 
markets. Empirical analyses of Texas's closed claims data have helped 
to evaluate whether trends in the liability system actually justified the 
noneconomic damages cap passed in Texas and whether and to what 
extent the cap might impact litigation outcomes. The studies suggest 
that much of the rhetoric missed the mark. 
A. Did Conditions Warrant Caps and Other Reforms? 
The Texas closed claims data have been used to test multiple claims 
of tort reform proponents. With respect to the number of claims, the 
data do not support rhetorical claims that the number of medical mal-
practice claims steeply increased prior to the passage of the statutory 
nonecOllOmic damages cap. Instead, the data demonstrate that the 
per capita claims rate was stable from 1990 to 2002.28 Whether growth 
rates are measured using total number of claims per year, number of 
large paid claims, or percentage of claims that resulted in large 
payouts, the conclusion is the same: the number of large paid claims 
did not increase over time.29 In fact , when we control for changes in 
the number of practicing physicians or growth in inflation-adjusted 
healthcare spending, we find that the number of large paid claims de-
creased.30 Both the number of claims with payments of less than 
$10,000 and with payments between $10,000 and $25,000 appear stable 
over time.J1 
How about claims related to payment size prior to the passage of 
the 2003 damages cap? More specifically, do the data support claims 
that payment size was skyrocketing during the late 1990s and early 
2000s? Again, the empirical results suggest that these assertions were 
greatly exaggerated. Despite the variability and possible increase in 
the average damages awards from 1988 to 2002,32 payouts per claim 
28. rd. 
29. Id. Adjusting for population growth, the number of physicians, and heallhcare spending 
allows us to control for changes in claims rales due to changes in the number of Texas residents. 
'd. It is important 10 control for changes in these va riables because if, for example, we find that 
claims rates increased due to a populalion increase, we would nOI character ize the claims rate 
increase as a crisis. 11 is somelhing that we would expect. 
30. 'd. at 231 figA, 233 Ibl.1. 
31. 'd. at 234 figS 
32. 'd. at 249-5 1. 
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were either relatively stable or slightly increased.33 After controlling 
for the increase in healthcare costs, which is a significant component 
of amounts paid to injured patients, average payouts were either sta-
ble or declined over time.:>4 Defense costs per large paid claim in-
creased over the period but did so gradually.3!i In addition, defense 
costs comprise only a small fraction of payout dollars.36 As a percent-
age of Texas gross state product, the total cost for aU large paid claims 
(including inflation-adjusted indemnified amounts and defense costs) 
was roughly flat over 1990-2002.37 Thus, the gradual increase in total 
costs during the late 1990s is likely explained by a predictable increase 
in medical costs, not an out-of-control liability system.38 
These results, taken together, suggest that the data do not support 
those who use claims about the sta te of the medical malpractice li abil -
ity system in Texas in order to justify tort reform . Contrary to the 
assertions of tort reform proponents, closed claims data suggest little 
connection between the liability system and premium fluctuations.39 
If a broken liability system was not behind the sharp increase in 
insurance premiums during the late 19905 and early 2000s, it raises the 
question , what was? One possibility is that increases were the unin-
tended consequence of price regulations. Specifically, when Texas 
passed its 1995 tort refonn package, it also imposed a mandatory in-
surance premium reduction based on expected losses to ensure that 
the predicted savings of insurers would be passed on to healthcare 
providers.4o Prices declined for three years, reflecting the belief of the 
insurers and regulators that tort reform would reduce losses. Sharp 
33. Id. at 238 fig.9. Note that while median payouts remained stable from 1996 to 2000. the 
mean payout increased from roughly $280,000 10 $360.000 (a twenty·nine percent increase). In· 
surance premium increases, however, far o utpaced this increase. See id. at 224 fig. I. 
34. 'd. al 237-4 1. 
35. rd. al 243 fig. I I. 
36. Id. at 245. Data on 2;e ro payout and small payout claims are unavai lable; therefore. 11 is 
impossible to estimate the change in total defense costs over time. Black et at. however. cast 
doubt on the possibil ity that defense costs caused the sharp premium increases. Id. 
37. Id. at 248 fig. 13. 
38. Id. at 248. 
39. Black et al. note that because data on open claims is unavailable premium increases might 
in f,ct be due to an increase in the number of claims or an increase in expectcd payouts on open 
claims. See id. a t 210. While the dala employed in their study cannot rule out this possibility, the 
authors argue that it is unlike ly. See jd. at 210, 218-19. In any event , this hypothesis will be 
testable as open claims close and reports are filed with TO!. In addition. TOI does no t co llect 
data on physician specialty. Therefore, the da1a cannol be used to study connections between 
the liability system and insurance markets for subsets of physician$ that are particu larly hard hit 
by insurance premium increases (e.g. , obstetricians). Despite this limitation, the data are useful 
for debunking more general rhetocical claims. 
40. See Tru(. INS. CODE. ANN. § 5.131 (Vernon 2006) (repealed Apr. 1, 2007). 
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price increases, however, began in 1998.41 This observation is consis-
tent with the theory that tort reform did not reduce losses as much as 
expected and that insurers were forced to substantially increase rates 
(and regulators were forced to honor these rate increase requests) in 
order to replenish their reserves that were hit hard by the below-cost 
pricing following tort reform.42 Black et al. posit additional alterna-
tive explanations, including contemporaneous shocks to reinsurance 
markets and the long-tail nature of medical malpractice claims.43 Ulti-
mately, further study is required to uncover the cause of price in-
creases in Texas. 
While data Jimitations~such as unobservable defense costs and the 
lack of information on the impact of the Liability system across medi-
cal specialties44- might hinder our ability to draw definitive conclu-
sions regarding whether the liability system is responsible for the 
sharp increase in premiums, empirical studies are helpful in shifting 
the debate away from rhetoric and toward reality. Analyses of this 
kind can help shift the burden of proof to tort reform proponents by 
compelling them to substantiate their claims with evidence. As the 
next Section demonstrates, empirical studies can also help determine 
whether tort reforms are successful. 
8. Have Reforms Met Their Intended Goals? 
In debates over whether to reform the liability system in order to 
ste"1 the rise of medical malpractice insurance premiums, rhetoric 
about the potential impacts of tort reform is as common as rhetoric 
about the out-of-control liability system. Proponents of tort reform 
often point to evidence produced by industry players with an interest 
in the outcome of the debate, suggesting that implementation of dam-
ages caps, limitations on joint and several liability, reform of collateral 
source rules, tightening of statutes of limitations, and other reforms 
have a substantial impact on medical malpractice insurance 
premiums.45 
Recent studies, however, have demonstrated fairly convincingly 
that tort reforms do not substantially reduce insurance premiums. 
41. Su Black et al. , 511pra note 7, at 254. 
42. Su id. I am current ly constructing a multiSlate dataset to investiga te this conjecture. 
43. Id. at 253-54. 
44. Texas does not require reporting of defense C()Sts when small payouts are made. Su supra 
nOle 12. It also does not require insurers to report the provider's specialty. See 5upra note 9. 
45. Su e.g., Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Facts About Tort Liability and lIS Impact on Consumers, 
hllp:l/www.atra.orglwrnpJfiles.cgi/7%3_howtortreform.html (last visi ted Dcc. 14,20(9) (provid-
ing information about the costs of the U.S. tort system; figures are from a 2004 report by Tilling-
hast , an insurance industry consultancy). 
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Empiricists have investigated the impacts of various tort reforms on 
claims rates, average payouts, and insurance premiums. The results, 
some of which are summarized below, suggest that reforms have little 
to no impact on these variables, although the most restrictive damages 
caps seem to have some impact.46 
While some evidence suggests that joint and several liability limita-
tions are associated with lower premiums,47 other results suggest that 
these limitations do not decrease payouts.48 Although, to my knowl-
edge, we do not have evidence about this reform's impact on the 
claims rate , the evidence related to premiums and payouts in Texas is 
consistent with the conjecture that, in the absence of an effect of joint 
and several liability reform on average payouts, mandatory price de-
creases, passed in conjunction with tort reforms, caused the observed 
price decreases. 
Findings related to the impacts of statutes of limitations and repose 
reforms are also mixed. Some studies suggest that these reforms re-
duce average payouts;49 some suggest they do not.so Other studies 
suggest tbat tbese reforms reduce claim frequency;sl some find they 
do not.S2 Similarly, some studies conclude that these reforms reduce 
46. All studies cited in this section use sophisticated methods to estimate effects and control 
for alternative explanations. 
47. Set! Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Stale TOri Reform Legislalion: AsstS5ing Our 
Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, ANO 
CONSUMER WEU'ARE 272, 274-75 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991 ); Patricia M. Dam:on, Andrew J. 
Epstein & Sooll J , Johnson, The Crisis in Medical Malpractice lnSllrance, in BROOKINGS-WHAR. 
TON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 55, 82 ( R. Harris & R. Litan eds. 2004); W. Kip Viscusi et 
al. , The Effect of 198& TOri Reform Legislation on General Liabiliry and Medical Malpractice 
lnsurance, 6 1. RISK & UNCERTAlf"l~ 165, 165 (1993). BUI see Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical 
Malpractice "Crisis»: Recent Trends Qrld the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF. W4-2D, 
W4·25 to W4·26 (Supp. Web Exclusives Jan. 21, 2(04), available at hUp:lloontenl.heallh 
affairs.org!cgilcontenllfull/hlthaff. w4.2OvIlDC1. 
48. See Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the lmpact of TOri Reforms on Medical Mal· 
practice Selllement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. SI83, S206 (2007): Blackmon & Zeckhauser. 
supra note 47, at 277; Viscusi e t al., supra note 47, at 181-82; Teresa M. Waters et al.. Market 
Walch: Impact of Siale Tort Reforms on PhysiciQrl Malpractice Paymenrs, 26 H EALTH AFF. 500, 
508 (2007). 
49. See Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. & ECON. 
11 5, 139 (1984). 
SO. See Frank A. Sloan, Paula M. Mergenhagen & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Efft!Crs of Tori Re-
forms on the Value afClosed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysi5, 14 1. HEALTH POL. 
POI..' y & L. 663, 674 (1989); Stephen Zuckennan, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, Effects 
of TOri Reforms and Other FaclOr:; on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQU IRY 167. 
180 (1990); Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 278; Waters e t al. , supra nOle 48, at 507. 
51. See Patricia M. Danwn, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New 
Evidence, 49 LAW & CoNTEMi'. PRODS. 57, 71 (1986); Zuckennan et aI., supra note 47, at 167. 
52. See Danwn, supra note 49, at 116. 
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premiums,s3 but others find no association between the reforms and 
premiums.54 Further investigation of the impacts of statutes of limita· 
tions and repose reform is required in order to more confidently as-
sess how these reforms affect outcomes. 
The literature, however, does signal consensus on the impacts of a 
number of reforms, including attorney contingency fee limits, collat-
eral source offsets, pre tri al screening panels, and periodic payments. 55 
The majority of published studies find that these reforms do not de-
crease claim frequency, payment severity, or premiums. The general 
rhetoric prevalent in tort reform debates might account (or the contin-
ued popularity of these reforms despite the strong evidence that they 
do not achieve their intended goals. 
The evidence on the effectiveness of damages caps-the most popu-
lar tort reform- is mixed.56 Some analysts find that caps on 
noneconomic damages do not significantly lower premiums.57 Others 
find that states have enjoyed premium reductions when they cap both 
economic and noneconomic damages or when they implement rela-
tively restrictive caps.58 Likewise, some analysts find that caps lead to 
small decreases in defensive medicine,59 but o the rs find no effect.60 In 
particular, Morrisey et al. find no impact of caps on health insurance 
premiums for employer-sponsored insurance,61 while Avraham and 
Schazenbach find (1) a positive association between caps on total 
damages and rates of private healthcare coverage for price-sensitive 
53. See Zuckerman et at , supro note 50, a t 167. 
54. See Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supro note 47, at 287; Frank A. Sloan, StIlte Responses to the 
Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEA \..TH Po\... PO\..'y 
& L. 629, 629 (1985). 
55. See Michelle Mello, Medical Malpraclice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of StIlte Tort Re-
forms 10 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Research Synthesis Reporl , 2006), available at 
ht lp:Jlwww.policysynthesis.org. 
56. See id. at 9-11. 
57. See BHAT. supra note 6, al 109; Z uckerman et aI. , Sllpra note 50, at 180. 
58. See BHAT, supra nOle 6, at 101-03; Danzan et aI., supra note 47, al 89; Meredith L. Kil-
gore, Michael A. Morrisey & Leonard J. Nelson, TOri Law and Medical Ma/practiu Insurance 
Premiums, 43 INQUIRY 255, 255 (2006); Thorpe, supra note 47, at W4-20; Z uckerman et aI. , supra 
nOle SO, at 180. 
59. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law Affects Medical Produc-
tivity, 21 J. HEAI..TH ECON. 931,932 (2002). 
60. See CONCRESSIONAI.. BUOGET OFFICE, LIMITINC TORT LIAB II..ITY FOR MEOICA I.. MA ..... 
PRACTICE (2004), available at hllp:llwww.cbo.go~!showdoc.crm?index=4968&sequence=:(l (find· 
ing thai reducing lorl liabi lity does nOI reduce medical spending); see also Frank A. Sloan & 
John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for "Defensive Medicine"? A Reassessment, 28 J . 
HEAI..TH EcoN. 481, 481 (2009) (concluding Ihat "Ion reforms do not significanlly arfect medical 
decisions"). 
6 1. See Michael A. Morrisey, Meredilh L Kilgore & Leonard (Jack) Nelson, Medica! Mal-
practice Reform and Employer-Sponsored Heallh Insurance Premiums, 43 HEA \"TIl SERVICES 
RES. 2124, 2124 (2008). 
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buyers, and (2) no association between bealthcare cove rage and puni-
tive and noneconomic damages caps.62 In sum, while damages caps 
have been found in some cases to achieve their intended goals, albeit 
having small impacts on outcomes, much evidence supports the claim 
that caps fail to stabilize medical malpractice insurance markets. 
Due to the small number of cla ims closed post-cap, the Texas closed 
claims data cannot be used to accurately estimate the impacts of tort 
reform. D avid Hyman and his co-authors, however, used it to esti-
mate the hypotheticaL impact of the 2003 noneconomic damages cap 
on payouts related to claims closed from 1988 to 2004.63 Hyman e t al. 
first estimate the impact the cap would have had on jury verdicts.64 
They the n use this analysis to consider how the cap might have af-
fected settlements.65 The results comport with prior findings:66 while 
caps would have had a substantial impact on damages awards at trial , 
the impact on actual payouts would have been much smaller, although 
substantial given the restrictive cap of $250,000.67 Most importantly, 
their findings provide clues as to why caps might not impact medical 
malpractice insurance premiums in predicted ways. Using insights 
from previous research that finds that payouts in Texas rarely exceed 
the provider 's insurance policy limits, Hyman et al. note that damages 
caps that exceed average policy limits should no t have a substantial 
impact.68 Thus, while Hyman and his colleagues' analysis certainly 
cannot provide a complete ly accurate picture of how the cap would 
have impacted outcomes (because, for example, some claims would 
not have been brought at all had caps bee n imposed) ,69 it does help 
explain, at least in part , why caps might not impact payouts and pre-
miums in predicted ways. 
62. See Ronen A ... raham & Max M. Schanzenbach. Impact of TOri Reform 011 Private Hea/rh 
lllSurollce Coverage (Nw. Uni .... Sch. o f Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Series. Paper No. 07-
16, 2007). available a/ htlp:l/ssm.comlabstract=995270. 
63. Hyman et aI. , Evidellce from Texas. supra note 8, at 355. 
64. Id. al 364-65. 
65. Id. at 370-72. 
66. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying tex\. 
67. Hyman et at , Evidence from Texas, supra note 8, at 405 ("We fi nd that th is cap will ha ... e 
economically significant effects. For tried cases, holding case mix constant , the cap will reduce 
allowed noneconomic damages by an estimated 73%, allowed ... erdicts by 38% , and payouts by 
27-percent. In sett led cases, the estimated decl ine in payouts is 18%."). 
68. See illfra notes 99- 1 JO and accompanying text (discussing the impact of poliey limits on 
payouts). 
69. In addition, the authors made a number of assumptions about how caps impact damages 
awards because they lacked important information such as the portion of economic damages 
attributed to medical expenses, to which the dea th cap does not apply. See Hyman et aI. , Evi-
dence from Texas, supra note 8, at 366. 
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Empirical studies have not only demonstrated the general ineffec-
tiveness of tort reform, but tbey have also exposed some potentially 
harmful impacts that tort reforms can have on subsets of the injured 
patient population. Using Texas closed claims data, Hyman et al. pre-
dict a disparate impact across plaintiff groups, with the deceased, un-
employed, and (likely) elderly plaintiffs enduring much larger 
reductions in recoveries than other plaintiffs.70 Mello reports results 
that demonstrate a similar effect for the most severely injured pJain-
tiffs.11 The literature addressing this question is thin, however; more 
research is needed in order to better understand whether and how 
caps impact outcomes across various subsets of claimants. It should 
be noted, however, that relatively low recoveries are not the sale con-
cern. Analysts must also consider the difficulty these types of patients 
will have in finding lawyers who are willing to represent them pursu-
ant to contingency fee arrangements. This impact is difficult to esti-
mate, but it remains an important part of the big picture. 
Recent sophisticated empirical studies that examine the impacts of 
tort reform on the liability system and insurance markets make it diffi-
cult for proponents of tort reforms to claim that traditional reforms, 
such as · damages caps! will substantially quell rising insurance premi-
ums without reducing the neediest claimants' ability to recover. Data 
have certainly allowed more objective assessments of the trade-offs 
we face in exchange for potential marginal benefits obtained from im-
plementing the most effective tort reforms. 
Ill. DRAWING INFERENCES FROM LARGE VERDICT AWARDS 
In addition to rhetoric on the connection between the liability sys-
tem and insurance markets, tort refonn debates are also often influ-
enced by unsubstantiated claims related to trends in medical 
malpractice jury verdicts and how these verdicts impact eventual in-
surer payouts and premiums. Proponents of tort reform argue that 
out-of-control juries hold healthcare providers liable for medical mal-
practice more often than they should72 and that juries have been 
awarding plaintiffs increasingly large amounts of damages, which 
70. Set! id. at 381-82. 
71. Set! Melio, supra note 55, at 13. 
72. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb LawsuilS, WA SH. POST,Jan. 6, 2005, at A6. 
Id. 
Bush surrounded himself with doctors in white coats to argue that "junk lawsuits" were 
driving physicians out of places such as CoUinsviUc, ranked by advocates as the friendli · 
est place in tbe United States for trial lawyers chasing big awards. "You see firsthand 
what happens when the system gets out of control," he told a crowd of supporters. 
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forces insure rs to either substantially increase premiums or ex it the 
market.73 
A recent empirical study by David Studdert and others provides 
one of the first assessments of tort reform propone nts' claims that 
medical liability system error rates are excessively high.74 They find 
that error rates are lower than tort reform proponents ofte n c1aim.15 
In roughly 73% of claims in which physicians concluded that medical 
error caused the plaintiffs injury , the plaintiff received compe nsation. 
In addition, in roughly 72% of claims in which no medica l error was 
found, plaintiffs received no compensation.76 The authors also find 
that payment size is positively correlated with whether a medica l error 
occurred.77 These findings suggest that the liability system's e rror 
rate, while substantial and cause for concern, is not as high as some 
have c1aimed.7s 
Recent empirical findings also allow us to assess claims about trends 
in Texas medical malpractice verdicts and how verdicts impact payouts 
and premiums. Section A summarizes recent findings, which suggest 
that despite an increase in Texas medical malpractice jury awards, 
payouts have remained stable over time.79 Section B describes evi-
dence that might help explain this counterintuiti ve finding. The evi-
dence suggests that insurance policy limits tend to limit payouts 
regardless of verdict size. Patients ra rely recover more than the pro-
vider's policy limit, even when juries award large verdicts.so Finally. 
Section C presents fi ndings that are consistent with the claim that 
Texas physicians are strategical1y decreasing their insurance coverage, 
73. Su, e.g., James Dao, A Push in Smles to Curb Malpractice Costs, N.Y. TIMl'S, Jan. 14, 2005, 
al All ("{MJany insurance companies had slopped issuing policies, reducing compeli lion and 
causing premiums to rise."); She ryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Rejects Award Limits in Malpractice, 
N.Y. TIMes, May 9, 2006, al A2S ("Mr. Frist and other supporters of revamping malpraclice law, 
including the American Medical Association, have argued for years Ihat rising insurance rates, 
fueled by skyrocketing jury awards, Ire d riving doctors out of business and compromising pa-
tie nl cart. ~). 
74. See David Studdert et al., Claims, Erron, and Comperuation Payments in Medical Mal-
practice Litigatian, 354 NEW ENO. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006). 
15. Id.. al2031. 
16. Id. 8t 2027-28. 
17. Id. at 2024. 
19. Id. at 2031 ("[Pjortraits of a malpractice system that is stricken with frivolous litigation are 
overblown."). It is important to nOle that physicians who reviewed the medical records associ-
ated with these cases had access to the litigation outcome, which mighl have innuenced their 
medical e rror determinations. See id. al 2031-32 (cautioning the reader about several limita tions 
of the study). Additional research is required to confi rm conclusions drawn from the study 
about the liability system error rale. 
79. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
80. Su discussion infra Part III.B. 
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which might further reduce payments that injured patients receive.8 ] 
While additional research is necessary to more fully understand the 
relationship between the liability system and insurance markets, the 
current evidence suggests that Texas might be experiencing a patient 
compensation crisis, rather than a medical malpractice liability crisis. 
A. Verdicts v. Payouts 
Tort reform proponents often point to large verdict awards as evi-
dence of a broken medical malpractice liability system. They argue 
that unjustified blockbuster awards encourage plaintiff attorneys, who 
typically work on a contingency fee basis, to play the "lawsuit 101-
tery."82 In addition, they claim that awards impact not only claims 
rates, but also settlement behavior of claimants and insurers. Fear of 
out-of-control juries, the argument goes, compels insurers to settle 
even non meritorious claims with large payments. 
Using verdicts to predict settlement behavior, however, might lead 
to substantial errors if payouts and verdicts tend to diverge. Payouts 
can be lower than verdicts for several reasons: (1) adjustments made 
through remittitur, (2) appellate court reversals, (3) imposition of stat-
utory damages caps, and (4) post-verdict settlement negotiations. 
Conversely, we expect payouts to exceed verdicts in some cases, such 
as when plaintiffs accept payments in excbange for foregoing the ap-
peal of pro-defendant verdicts. Therefore, data on verdicts might lead 
to false impressions about the amount of money that changes hands. 
Actual payments have been notoriously difficult to estimate, given the 
lack of available data on settlements. 
My co-authors and I used the Texas data on claims closed from 1988 
to 2003 to estimate differences between verdicts and payouts.83 We 
find that payouts fall far short of verdicts in the vast majority of "large 
claim" cases~cases with total payouts of at least $25,000 in 1988 dol-
lars.84 While jury verdicts and payouts are positively correlated, 75% 
of post-verdict payments were lower than the adjusted verdict, which 
is defined as jury award plus pre- and post-judgment interest.85 An 
analysis of 306 verdicts handed down in large claim cases closed from 
81. Su discussion infra Part 1II.e. 
82. See generally JEFFREY O'CONNEL.L, THE LAWSUIT loTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WII''' 
(1979). 
83. See Hyman et aI. , supra note 8, at 3. Of 13,269 incidents of alleged malpractice that reo 
sulted in payouts of at leaSt $25,000 (in 1988 dollars) , 690 (5.1%) went to trial and 315 (2.7%) 
resulted in a verdict. Jd. at 16 tbl.2. Fifteen cases that involved bench trials were excluded from 
the analysis. Itl. 
84. Id. at 4. 
85. /d. at 5. Five percent of payouts following verdicts exceeded adjusted verdicts. Id. at 6. 
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1988 to 2003 revealed that plaintiffs received only 56% of total ad-
justed verdicts ($212 million total payouts following adjusted verdicts 
totaling $482 million),86 The mean per-case "haircut" was 29% of the 
adjusted verdict, and the median was 19%.87 
In addition, the study finds that haircuts and adjusted verdicts are 
positively correlated. Forty-seven percent of plaintiffs who were 
awarded adjusted verdicts of less than $100,000 experienced an aver-
age haircut of 8% per case,sa In contrast, ninety-eight percent of 
plaintiffs who were awarded adjusted verdicts in excess of $2.5 million 
experienced an average haircut of 56%,89 As the adjusted verdict in-
creases, both the percentage of cases taking a haircut and the average 
per-case haircut increase.90 These findings underscore the difficulties 
inherent in justifying tort reform by pointing to verdicts, often widely 
reported by the press, and ignoring eventual payouts, which the press 
almost never reports. 
While accounting for the differences between verdicts and payouts 
is important , understanding why these differences occur will better 
our understanding of the tort system's inner workings. The following 
Section summarizes findings that illuminate the various factors that 
drive the verdict-payout discrepancy. 
B. Explaining the Discrepancy 
Remittitur, appellate court reversals, imposition of damages caps, 
and post-verdict settlement negotiations account for a portion of the 
$270 million that Texas plaintiffs were awarded from 1988 to 2003 but 
never received.91 The data TOl collects allow us to estimate the im-
pact of various mechanisms that aim to limit post-verdict payments. 
Judicial oversight in the form of remittitur, judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict (JNOY), and appellate reversals had a small direct im-
pact on haircuts.92 Judges reduced verdicts through remittitur in 
roughly 5% of cases, for a total reduction of approximately $9 million 
(3.3% of the total haircut).93 JNOY and appellate reversals also ac-
86. {d. al 25. 
87. Id. See id. al 14, for delaib on how pre· and post-judgment inlerest were computed. 
88. {d. al 6. 
89. fd. 
90. fd. at 32 tbl.lO. 
91. Id. at 4-6. 
92. Id. at 6. It should be noted tha t judicial oversight might indirect ly impact post·verdict 
settlement negotiations. This indireci impact is impossible to measure; therefore, we likely un· 
derestimate tbe innuence of judicial oversight on haircuts. 
93. Id. at 35. If reversed remittiturs are excluded, the total reduction is approximately SS.S 
million (2% of the total haircut). Id. 
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count for a small portion of the total haircut in large payout c1aims-
roughly $2.5 million of the $270 million total haircut (about 1 % of the 
total haircut).94 
During the period we studied, legislators required Texas courts to 
impose statutory caps on punitive damages and damages awarded in 
death cases.9S The punitive damages cap reduced damages awards in 
5 of the 22 cases in which punitive damages were awarded.96 The total 
reduction was roughly $44 million, which amounts to 62% of the 
awarded punitive damages and 16% of the total haircut. A cap on 
recovery in wrongful death cases applied in 66 cases.97 The cap does 
not apply to medical expenses, and TDI does not report these ex-
penses separately; thus, the impact of this cap is a rough estimate.9s 
At most, however, we estimated that the wrongful death cap ac-
counted for roughly $38 million of the $270 million total haircut 
(roughly 14% of the total haircut). Therefore , together, statutory caps 
accounted for approximately 30% of the total haircut. This estimate, 
plus the estimated impact of judicial oversight, leaves roughly two-
thirds of the total haircut to be explained. 
It turns out that the largest portion of the total haircut is due to the 
fact that plaintiffs rarely collect more than the provider's insurance 
policy limit , even when the adjusted verdict greatly exceeds the policy 
limit.99 Figure 1 displays payout-to-policy-limit ratios for single-payer 
cases in which the policy limit was at least as large as the adjusted 
verdict and cases in which the adjusted verdict exceeded the policy 
limit ("above-limits cases").IOO For cases in which the payout-to-pol-
icy-limit ratio was 100%, the payout was exactly equal to the policy 
limit. As Figure 1 reflects, 31 % (24 out of 77) of above-limits single-
payer cases had payouts between 95% and 105% of policy limits. A 
majority (53%) of above-limits cases settled at or below policy limits, 
with the limits effectively capping recovery.101 Depending on the as-
94. /d. at 36. 
95. See id. al 12-13, for a de5Cription of the caps. 
96. Id. at 36-37. 
97. Id. at 38. 
98. Id. Wc assumed that none of the economic damages were for medical expenses; therefore, 
we overestimated the impact of the wrongful death cap. 
99. Id. at 39-47. 
100. We included only single-payer cases in this analysis because we do not have full informa-
tion about excess coverage in multi·payer cases. Of the 315 cases that went to verdict, 214 were 
single-payer cases with sufficient infonnation on policy limits to analyze the impact of limits on 
payouis. Id. at 39. Caution should be used when drawing inferences from single·payer cases, 
however. For example, payouts related to single-payer cases are smaller than those for multi-
payer cases. Id. at 15. 
101. fd. at 41. 
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sumptions adopted to estimate the impact of policy limits on recov-
eries, policy limits accoun t for 73% to 87% of total haircuts in single-
payer cases.102 For this subset of cases, judicial oversight and caps 
explain only 1.5% to 15% of the total hai rcu t, depending on estima-
tion assumptions. I OJ 
FIGUR E 1: THE I MPACT OF LIMITS ON P A YOUTS 104 
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In a separate study, we analyzed the impact of policy limits on 
payouts in all claims against physicians with payouts of at least $25,000 
in 1988 dollars, including those that senie prior to vcrdict. lOs We find 
that policy limits act as de facto caps in these cases as wel1; only 1.5 % 
of large payout claims had above-limit pay mentsY)6 Interestingly, pri-
ma ry carriers funded most of these payments. lin Physicians made out-
of-pocket payments in only 62% of the 9,525 cases that closed from 
102. l eL at 46. One estimate assumes that caps and rcmilli turs arc applied first and then policy 
limits bind the payment. The other assumes policy limits bind the payment before caps and 
rcmillitu rs have an impact. 
103. Id. 
104. leL at 42 fig.6. 
lOS. Zeiler e t al.. supra note 8. at S9. 
106. Id. at 511. 
107. !d. While we did not cxplore the reasons why insurers pay IImounts above the limits. we 
conjccture that insurers make payments in some CliseS to avoid bad faith se ttlement cla ims by 
providcrs who wish to sellie when tbe insurer wishes to defend the provider against the claim. 
Id. at 53!. 
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1990 to 2003.108 In addition, although we might expect more out-of-
pocket payments in cases in which policy limits are low, we find that 
low policy limits did not trigger a flood of out-DC-pocket payments by 
physicians. 109 Physicians with $250,000 per occurrence policies made 
an out-oF-pocket payment in only 32 of 2,488 claims (1.3%).110 
While additional unobservable factors, such as high-low agree-
ments, likely explain a portion of the total haircut, post-judgment set-
tlements clearly play a substantial role in reducing payments to 
plaintiffs, even when the plaintiffs win large verdicts. This alone is 
cause for concern, given the primary goals of the tort system: to com-
pensate negligently injured patients for their losses and to deter negli-
gence. Concern might extend beyond this, however, if we consider 
how physicians might react as they learn that they face limited per-
sonal exposure even when injured patients might perceive them as be-
ing underinsured. 
Although we do not fully understand why policy limits act as de 
facto caps on recoveries, II I the Texas closed claim data provide some 
insights into coverage trends.112 The following Section discusses the 
findings associated with policies purchased by Texas physicians who 
were involved in large paid claims. 
C Trends in Medical Malpractice Coverage and 
Implications for Tort Recoveries 
The conventional wisdom seems to be that physicians hold medical 
malpractice insurance policies with $1 million per-occurrence limits.1I 3 
The Texas closed claims data suggest otherwise, at least for policies 
that covered large paid claims closed from 1990 to 2003. The median 
policy limit for the ' subset of policies covering these claims was 
$500,000 in nominal dollars.1l4 Only 31 % of policies in the sample 
108. 'd. al 526. 
109. fd. al 527. 
110. fd. 
1I1. 'd. al 539. 
112. 'd. al S32-S34. 
113. See, e.g. , Frederick W. Cheney, How Much Professionul Liabilily Coverage Is Enough? 
Lessons from Ihe ASA Closed Claims PrOjeCl, AM. 5oc'y ANESnfESIOLOGISTIi NEWSLETTER. 
lune 1999, hllp:llwww.asahq.org/Newslcllers/I999I06_99fHow0699.hlml (examining Ihe "con-
venlional wisdom" Ihal physicians purchase insurance wilh $1 million per-occurrence limilS and 
$3 million 10lal annual limi ts); AMERICAN COLl_EOE OF EMEROENCY PHYSICIANS, MEDICAl.. 
PROFESSIONAl.. LIABII..ITY INSURANCE 7 (2004), hltp:llwww.acep.orgfNRlrdonlyres/DD94E243-
339F-4A02-983D-7S63D42BCE7410/ MPLIpaperApril04.pdf (claiming lhal "[mlosl policies pro-
vide $1 million for each incide nl wilh a maximum of $3 million pcr policy period"). 
114. Zeiler et al., supra note 8, at 532. 
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had limits of $1 million. lIS Six percent had limits of more than $1 
millio n, and 32% had limits of $200,000 or less. 116 
Insurers in Texas are required to report the year in which a physi-
cian purchased the policy that covered the paid claim.117 These data 
allow us to estimate time trends in physician purchasing habits fo r pol-
icies covering large paid claims. Sample sizes for purchase years 
1988-1999 were suffici ent to estimate average limits. Figure 2 displays 
time trends in policy size by purchase year for perinatal and non per-
ina tal physicians.118 Real mean and medium limits on policies pur-
chased by both perinatal and nonperinatal physicians who were late r 
involved in large paid claims fell by roughly 30% from 1988 to 1999.11 9 
FIGURE 2: P ER INATAl.. AND NONPERINATAL PHYSIC IAN 
POl..lCY SIZE BY PURCHASE YEAR t 20 
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Although our study did not investigate what might be driving the 
decline in real coverage, we offer a few conjectures_12l One theory, 
115, !d. 
116. Id. 
117. See supra note 9_ 
1 [8. While TDI does not require insurers to report the specialty of the physician against 
whom a claim is made, it does requi re reporl ing of the pa tient 's age. We characte rize a ll claims 
for injury to palients aged one month or younger at the lime of the injury as per inata l claims. 
This allows us to estimate trends fo r a group of physicians though t to be hardest hit by the out -
of·contro l liabi lity system. See Zeile r e l aI., supra note 8, at 518. 
119. fd. a t S33- S34. Declines over lime were stat istically significant a t the I % Signi ficance 
leve l. fd. 
120. fd. at 534 fig.9. Policies relate to s ingle-payer cases resolved with a payment of at least 
$25,000 in 1988 dollars. 
121. fd. al 538·39. 
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consistent with observed trends, suggests (hat physicians purchase 
smaller and cheaper policies after realizing that exposure is minute 
even when coverage is IOW.122 While most managed care organiza-
tions and hospitals require their physicians to hold liability insurance, 
physicians are likely able to influence decisions over required cover-
age levels. Whether declining coverage is explained by something as 
simple as an increase in premiums or relatively cheap alternatives-
e.g., asset protection strategies-or by a more complex story of strate-
gic behavior on the part of providers, declining coverage reduces pay-
ments under the li ability system. This, in turn, might limit the ability 
of the system to deliver just outcomes for injured patients. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These findings, together with o ther published findings, help us eval-
uate whether and how well the -medical malpractice liability system 
meets its primary goals: just compensa tion and deterrence. Contrary 
to the common rheto ric heard during tort re form debates, evidence 
suggests tha t the connection between the liability syste m and insur-
ance markets is tenuous, which makes it unsurprising that tort reform 
has little to no impact on insurance markets. In addition , Texas closed 
claims data suggest that large jury awards, which get ample press, are 
often fo llowed by much smaller payouts, a fact almost never accompa-
nying news of jumbo verdicts. A large portion of the differe nce is 
attributable to the finding that patients rarely receive more than the 
provider 's policy limits. This, coupled with the fact that Texas physi-
cians are purchasing less rea l coverage over time, suggests that we 
might be facing a patient compensa tion crisis rather than a medical 
malpractice liability crisis. 
While the data collected by the TD! have proven extre mely useful 
for esta blishing a se t of facts from which debates about how best to 
handle crises can begin , data on closed medical malpractice claims are 
rare. Either the data are not collected or they are collected but not 
made publicly available.123 Acade mic researchers have a substanti al 
122. Id. 
123. Florida and Missouri collect similar da tasets and make them publ icly avai lable. Michigan 
collects closed claims data , but they are available only in paper form. Illinois, New York, Minne-
sota, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Washington co llect closed claims data but do not a llow the 
public access to them. Most s ta tes do not collect such data. The Nat ional Pract itioner Data 
Bank (NPDB) also collects and allows public access to da ta on paid medical malpract ice claims. 
al though the da ta arc not audited for comple tenes.~ and accuracy. See Lawrence E. Smarr, A 
Compararive Ass~smelll of the PIA A Data Sharing Project and the Notional Practitioner Dara 
Bank: Policy, Purpase, and A pplication , 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoas. 59, 59 ( 1997); Joseph T. 
Hallinan, Allemplto Track Malpractice Cas~ Is Often Thwarted, WALL Sr. J., Aug. 27, 2004, a t I. 
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role to play in helping to increase the volume of available data, to 
establish factual baselines, and to study important yet unresolved 
questions. Involvement comes in many forms, including generating 
datasets from legal rules,124 gathering data from market players,l25 
and collaborating with organizations that work to increase the volume 
of available data that can be used to fashion more efficacious policy. 
To this end , I and others have been working with the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners to draft a model law that re-
quires state departments of insurance to coUect medical malpractice 
closed claims data from insurance companies and self·insured market 
actors,1 26 The hope is that a substantial number of states will adopt 
the model law and that uniform mulli-state data will be available to 
the public. Multi-state data would allow for a more sophisticated 
analysis of the causes of medical malpractice insurance crises (assum-
ing they exist) , the causes of medical error, and the impacts of tort 
reform on premiums, payments, and claims rates, just to name a few. 
Involvement by academics can mitigate, at least to some extent, the 
influence of industry actors who have strong incentives to keep the 
data private. 
It should be noted that we do not know much about the general-
izability of the results reported in the Texas studies. This is cause for 
concern as the state may differ in important ways from other states 
that experience severe fluctuations in medical malpractice insurance 
premiums. 127 In addition, all empirical studies are inherently limited 
due to missing observations, limited time periods, and other data im-
perfections. Studies produced using the Texas data , however, demon-
Despite the~e shortcomings, $Orne have used the NPDB data to analyze medical malpraetice 
liability trends. See, e.g .• Avraham, supra nole 48, at S183. 
124. See, e.g., Avraham, supra note 24, at 116-18 (constructing dataset of tori reforms passed 
by state and by year, including results of judicial determinations of constitut ional challenges to 
reforms). 
125. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, Ne.", Money, and the Morlll Economy o/To" LA.", in 
Action, 35 LAw &. Soc. Rev. 275 (2001) (employing qualitative data gathered from interviews of 
practicing medical malpractice attorneys to siudy why physicians lend not to payout o f their 
own pockets on claims with payments in excess of the policy limits); Albert Yoon, Dllmage Caps 
lind Civil LitiglltiQn: An Empirical Study 0/ Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South , 3 AM. 
LAw &. Ecol'<. Rev. 199,202 (2001) (using data obtained from a medical malpractice insurer to 
study the impacts of damage caps on payment severity). 
126. A draft of the model law, guidelines for companion regulations, and opinion leiters from 
interested parties-including physician groups, insurance companies, and academics-are availa· 
ble at http;lfwww.naic.orgfdocumentslcommilleeS_c_sitC080221_Med_MaCSITF _Requesc 
closed-claifTLreportin&J11ode l_law.pdf. 
127. For example, Texas has one of the nation's largest homestead exemptions, which might 
make it relatively easy for doctors to protect at least some of their assets from aetachment. Su 
TEX. COI'IST. arl. XVI, If 50, 51 (p!"otecting homes from forced sale for the payment of most 
debts). 
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strate tbe value of observation in understanding whether the liability 
system enhances or limits civil justice for injured patients. Policy mak-
ers are more likely to implement effective solu tions if debates stand 
on fi rm foundations that are established by facts rather than rhetoric. 
